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HE DEVELOP MENT OF LABOR ECONOMICS IN THE
postwar period can be characterized as a struggle for 
dominance between two species of genus economicus 
that skinned the labor-market cat quite differently.
The roots of one group were in the “institutionalist” 
approach to the subject, typified by a textbook on 
American labor issues, entitled Labor Problems, published in 1905 
by Thomas Adams and Helen Sumner. The authors state in the pref­
ace that “the principal aim of this book is to furnish a convenient 
collection of facts that will facilitate the study and the teaching of
the American labor problem___There has been given no statement
and little intimation of the general social theory which most logi­
cally and consistently explains the facts cited” (pp. v-vi).
The book has two parts: “ Evils” and “Remedies.” “Evils” contains 
chapters on female and child labor, immigration, the sweating sys­
tem, and poverty. “ Remedies” includes chapters on unions, profit- 
sharing, cooperation, industrial education, labor laws, and the
material progress of the wage-earning classes. The book contains 
very little economics, although both Adams and Sumner were 
members of the Department of Political Economy at the University 
of Wisconsin. As suggested here and argued in the next section, the 
heart of institutionalism is a detailed description of the practices 
and institutions affecting workers. The soul o f institutionalism, 
however, is reformist; markets are generally seen as harsh institu­
tions whose outcomes must be ameliorated by some form of collec­
tive action if social equity is to be achieved.
The other group of economists had its roots in the approach 
taken by neoclassical analysis,1 which characterizes the current text­
book of choice (at least one of us would like to think): Modern Labor 
Economics, by Ronald Ehrenberg and Robert Smith of Cornell 
University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations. The focus of 
this text is on economic theory, and its sections are organized along 
the lines of “demand,” “supply,” and “market” issues. Labor problems 
are seen far more as opportunities for the application of theoretical
The authors, both born and bred in the neoclassical tradition, would like to thank our colleagues 
Robert Aronson, Ronald Ehrenberg, Gary Fields, Robert Hutchens, George Jakubson, and Marcus 
Rebick for their perspectives on postwar labor economics and careful reading of a draff of this essay, 
and Hampton Finer for his excellent research assistance. They should in no way be blamed for either 
the essay’s incautious tone or any of its (probably numerous) departures from evenhandedness.
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analysis than as evils to be remedied; in fact, the word “evil” does not 
appear anywhere in the book (although Smith regularly cites Knievel 
in his class lectures as an example of someone who was handsomely 
rewarded for taking on risky work).
In the neoclassical view, markets improve social welfare by reallo­
cating resources through the voluntaristic mechanism of mutually 
beneficial transactions. Taking some initial distribution of resources 
as given, neoclassical theory focuses on voluntary transactions that si­
multaneously reallocate these resources and leave the affected parties 
better off; such transactions are said to promote “economic efficiency.” 
Thus, neoclassical theory separates the issues of distribution (equity) 
and allocation (efficiency), and it gives much more attention to the 
latter. Government interventions in markets, often advocated by one 
or more groups as promoting equity (however defined), are resisted 
or only cautiously approved by neoclassicists because such interven­
tions tend to suppress voluntary transactions.
This essay chronicles the intellectual ferment that was created as in­
stitutionalism flourished and then was overwhelmed by the neoclassi­
cal approach, only recently to make signs of a recovery. The ferment 
really concerns the larger issue of how to approach a social science, 
and to follow the action we must start with some background, which 
is covered in the following section.
Introducing the Institutional Leopard and 
Neoclassical Tiger
Put in one sentence, the focus of institutional labor economics is on 
“labor,” while the focus of the neoclassical approach is on “econom­
ics.” But what does this pithy sound-bite mean? To gain a fuller view of 
these two competing approaches to the subject of labor economics, it 
is useful to consider how each camp answers three questions.
What Are the Motives for Studying the Labor Market?
Underlying the institutionalist approach to the study of employment 
issues is a strong propensity toward social reform. To a large extent, the 
self-evident evils of low wages, poor working conditions, and worker 
powerlessness are seen as remedied by unionism or protective labor 
legislation. Indeed, the writings of institutionalists are often character­
ized by a passionate advocacy that can be traced back to the days when 
labor courses were taught in ethics departments (McNulty, 1984:148).
The writings of neoclassical economists are at least superficially de­
void of passion. This approach to the field strives to apply the princi­
ples and systematic analysis that characterize economic theory to 
employment issues, and in the past three or four decades the features 
and problems of the labor market increasingly have been seen as fer­
tile ground for the testing of economic hypotheses. Thus, whereas the 
institutionalist would see certain outcomes of labor markets as prob­
lems (even evils) to be remedied, the neoclassicist—even when agree­
ing with that ethical viewpoint—would first focus on understanding 
the market forces underlying such outcomes.
Which Approach Cares More about Workers?
Institutionalists have often claimed the moral high ground in their in­
tellectual battles with neoclassicists, and defense of this ethical turf is 
relatively easy because of their tendency to focus on the plight or the 
behavior of specific individuals or groups. Like the congressional 
committee seeking to build support for some piece of reform legisla­
tion, institutionalists can easily identify and bring forth either victims 
of market forces whose suffering is palpable or employers whose be­
havior is reprehensible. Those who place the focus of their analysis 
and concern elsewhere do so at the grave risk of being labeled hard­
hearted or—that word again—evil.
While some neoclassicists give little thought to the institutionalist 
charge of moral vagrancy, those who do feel the need to link their ef­
forts to issues of social betterment reply that social well-being is a 
function of the totality of individuals, and that both gains and losses 
(benefits and costs) should be analyzed when making policy.
Claiming to focus on the forest of consumer welfare rather than the 
trees of producer (including worker) interests, neoclassicists view the 
labor market as the primary means of directing labor resources to the 
production of socially desired goods and services. The competition 
among all sorts of producers that is spawned by freely functioning 
markets is seen as more socially desirable (because it advances con­
sumer interests) than the protection of specific groups that is often 
created by political intervention in the marketplace.
What Scientific Methodology Is Used?
The institutionalist approach to the field of labor economics tends to 
be inductive and “fact-based.” The analysis begins with certain facts, 
and the focus on individual behavior and outcomes lends itself to a 
case-study approach toward data gathering. From the intensive, often 
historical, study of individual cases come detailed descriptions about 
how various labor markets operate. Institutionalists defend their ap­
proach as based on reality, not on abstraction, but Ronald Coase, the 
1991 Nobel laureate in economics, sees the contributions of institu­
tionalists differently: “Without a theory they had nothing to pass on 
except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire” 
(Posner, 1993: 206).2
Neoclassical labor economics, with its focus on overall outcomes, 
tends to employ data from larger samples, but that is not the most strik­
ing difference between the two approaches. The neoclassical approach 
to labor economics tends to be theory-driven and therefore largely de­
ductive and ahistorical in nature. One starts with certain fundamental 
principles, and from theoretical analyses are drawn conclusions or hy­
potheses that are then tested with data from the labor market. The neo­
classical economist is looking for central social tendencies, not for 
individual pathologies—for analysis, not for description. In fact, the 
modern use of statistical techniques to ferret out a central tendency rel­
egates deviations from these tendencies to the “error term” of the esti­
mating equation. Caring deeply about market victims, institutionalists 
are understandably offended when harsh market outcomes seem to be 
dismissed by neoclassicists as “unexplained variation.”
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How the Institutionalist Leopard Acquired 
(at Least a Few) Economic Stripes
In the years immediately after World War II, institutionalist labor eco­
nomics was in full bloom. Yales Lloyd Reynolds published a textbook 
entitled Labor Economics and Labor Relations in 1949, and it was 
firmly institutionalist in approach. The book’s first sentence pro­
claimed it to be an “introduction to the study of labor” ; note that de­
spite its title, it was not introduced as a study of economics. The first 
60 percent of the book was devoted to unions (including chapters on 
union history, governance, and politics), and the chapters in the “eco­
nomics” section mainly described practices followed by firms and in­
dustries in setting wages. Filled with descriptive narrative on unions, 
government regulations, and employers’ practices, and sprinkled with 
a handful of tables and charts describing trends and conditions, the 
book contained virtually no discussions or analyses of how supply 
and demand affect the price of labor. The text had only one theory- 
related graph (p. 435), which purported to explain how the additional 
output derived from an additional labor-hour falls if more labor is 
hired with capital held constant. This graph, central to an understand­
ing of labor demand, was completely mislabeled, and the reader was 
led to thoroughly confuse the extra output of the first and last hours 
of labor hired. One can only surmise that neither the author nor the 
readers found this graph to be an important pedagogical device!
Why the author of a book with so little theory in it put “economics” 
in the title is a question that immediately comes to mind. The 1930s had 
seen the rise of a neoclassical analysis of the labor market with the pub­
lication of two books of the same title, The Theory of Wages, by John 
Hicks (1932) and Paul Douglas (1934). Hicks wrote that the purpose of 
his book was to restate “the theory of wages in a form which shall be 
reasonably abreast of modern economic knowledge” (1932: v).3
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Similarly, Douglas stated that “the patient accumulation of facts will in 
itself avail us little unless these facts are subjected to mathematical 
and statistical analysis to determine their inner relationships—  The 
author . . .  feels that the sooner economists come to use facts as means 
rather than as ends, the more rapid will be the progress of economic 
science” (1934: iii).
Thus, an approach to the subject of labor economics that emphasized 
general principles rather than descriptive detail was neither unknown 
nor awaiting discovery. Instead, it was explicitly rejected by many of 
those who called themselves labor economists in the 1930s and 1940s— 
driving Hicks into mathematical theory (see note 5) and Douglas into 
the Marines and later the U.S. Senate. Why those who studied labor is­
sues called themselves economists but explicitly rejected neoclassical 
theory can be explained by a catastrophe and a coincidence.
The catastrophe, of course, was the Great Depression. Unemploy­
ment rates of 25 percent, closed banks, bread lines, and the specter of 
revolution focused the attention of the thoughtful on individual suffer­
ing rather than abstraction. The market had clearly failed, and when 
unions gave “voice” and power to a large segment of the working class, 
they were justly regarded as saviors of our market system from more 
revolutionary, collectivist forces. It is little wonder that unions were 
accorded such prominence in postwar textbooks—and that market 
forces, in both theory and practice, were either dismissed or consid­
ered evils to be vanquished. In the second edition of The Theory of 
Wages, Hicks himself lamented that “1932 was not a lucky date for the 
appearance of a book like this. It was the blackest year of the Great 
Depression; there has been no date in this century to which the theory
th'at I was putting out could have been more inappropriate__ So, soon
after its birth, The Theory of Wages began to look like the last gasp of 
an ancien regime” (1963:303).
The coincidence was that the first academic study of the American 
labor movement had been published (in 1886) by an economist, not 
by a historian, sociologist, or scholar from some other social science. 
Richard T. Ely, a founder of the American Economic Association and, 
coincidentally, a friend of Cornells A. D. White, had learned his eco­
nomics at Columbia and in Germany just as “classical” economics was 
becoming transformed into the neoclassical tradition. The classical 
economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo had focused on eco­
nomic growth in a market economy, and it regarded human welfare as 
roughly proportional to the volume of output. A central purpose of 
classical analysis was to reveal how changes in the quality and quan­
tity of labor supply affected the growth of aggregate output.
The “new” classical economics that flowered in the late nineteenth 
century diverged in two ways: (1) it emphasized the maximization of 
utility (happiness), not wealth, as the key to human welfare; and (2) it 
stressed the allocation of a given set of resources, not secular growth, 
as the central“problem of economics” (Blaug, 1962: 273-74).
According to the English economist Joan Robinson, classical econom­
ics was concerned with “big questions” : the long-term growth of the 
economy and the distribution of output among wages, rent, and 
profit. Neoclassical economics, on the other hand, was concerned with 
“little questions,” such as
why does an egg cost more than a cup of tea? It may be a small question 
but it is a very difficult and complicated one. It takes a lot of time and a lot 
of algebra to work out the theory of it. So it k e p t... [economists] occupied 
for fifty years. They had no time to think about the big question, or even 
to remember that there was a big question, because they had to keep their 
noses right down to the grindstone, working out the theory of the price of 
a cup of tea. (Robinson, 1953: 22)
The attention given by neoclassical economists to prices and their 
underlying demand and supply conditions in allocating resources 
permitted analytical techniques that were abstract and (ultimately) 
mathematical. Ely came to regard the economics of the neoclassicists 
as “dry bones,” and he turned his attention to the study of practical
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Early Labor Econom ics at Cornell
In 1885-86, a Cornell economist by the name of Henry Carter Adams taught 
a course in political economy in which unions, protective labor legislation, 
and free trade were discussed. In March 1886, Adams delivered a paper be­
fore the Constitution Club in New York City, in which he argued against 
laissez-faire capitalism and in favor of government intervention in the econ­
omy. Later that spring, at a symposium on the "Labor Problem" held at 
Cornell, Adams defended the labor movement,and in particular the Knights 
of Labor in its strike against Jay Gould's Southwestern Railroad System.
These papers apparently infuriated Henry Sage, a major Cornell benefac­
tor and chairman of the Board of Trustees, who was not in favor of "self 
appointed reformers," especially when they happened to be on Cornell's 
faculty. As a result, Adams's contract was not renewed when it expired in 
1887, despite the support of his students and Richard Ely. He obtained a 
faculty appointment at the University of Michigan, and went on to become 
president of the American Economic Association in 1896 (Dorfman, 1954: 
28-37).
No separate courses in labor were offered by the economics department 
at Cornell for some two decades, until a brave soul by the name of Robert 
Hoxie undertook to do so from 1905 to 1907. He, too, soon left Cornell's
employ— although presumably voluntarily— and no labor specialist was on 
the faculty until Sumner Slichter came in the 1920s (McNulty, 1984:149-50).
Between 1938 and 1945, Cornell labor economist Royal Montgomery and 
coauthor Harry Millis of the University of Chicago published a three-volume 
study, The Economics of Labor. Despite its title,the two-thousand-page study 
concerned much more than economics, with most of the economics con­
fined to volume 1, written mainly by Montgomery.
Olin Library's copy of The Economics of Labor contains some interesting 
handwritten commentary by Montgomery's students, reflective of 1940s 
humor. One student wrote, "This book reads just like he talks," to which 
another responded, "Oh yea! Where, are the gestures?" As a check on labor 
economics students of today, we perused Catherwood Library's eight 
copies of Modern Labor Economics by Ehrenberg and Smith. We found 
prolific underlining but only one marginal note ("LEARN!"), written next to 
a section on income and substitution effects in the labor supply chapter. 
One can variously hypothesize that the subject matter is now more absorb­
ing, students are more serious (we hesitate to say "sober"), professors are 
more venerated, or that in this age of television, students are less inclined to 
engage in writing of any sort!
problems using a variety of methods, including historical. His inter­
ests were so wide that his graduate students later became professors of 
sociology and history, not just of economics. In 1892 the University of 
Wisconsin hired Ely to be director of the newly formed School of 
Economics, Political Science, and History, and in 1904 he hired 
John R. Commons, who was to become the founder of the “Wisconsin 
School” of institutional economics.
Because the boundaries of the social sciences in the late nineteenth 
century were much more flexible and permeable than they are now, 
intellectually vigorous social scientists of any stripe could have 
stepped forward to claim “labor problems” as the domain of their 
field. It is largely happenstance that Ely, Commons, and a handful of
other economists, such as a short-term Cornellian named Henry 
Carter Adams (see box above), did so for the field of economics.4 Thus 
it was that “labor problems,” which at the time was also claimed by the 
field of ethics, came into the domain of economics. And to economics 
departments, then, were attracted students of society who were induc­
tive in their method and reformist in their motive. These “institution­
alists” were not suffered gladly by those mainline economists intent 
on building a science in the image and likeness of physics, but they in­
sisted on calling themselves economists and putting “economics” in 
the titles of their books.
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Putting the Tiger of Theory in the Tank of Labor Issues
A half century ago institutionalist-based labor economics was clearly 
the dominant approach, but it was ripe for attack. Neoclassical theory 
had been newly invigorated by the application and extension of calcu­
lus to the analysis,5 unions were so powerful that they had lost some 
of the underdog status that had attracted early social reformers, and 
the profound fears of permanently high unemployment were becom­
ing a distant memory Even those with institutionalist roots began to 
speak of the need for general principles to help make sense of descrip­
tive facts,6 although—as we shall see—rhetoric preceded reality
In 1941, Princeton’s Richard Lester published a textbook entitled 
Economics o f Labor. He wrote that the book is “analytic rather than 
encyclopedic. The emphasis throughout the book is upon economic 
principles rather than upon particular events or ephemeral facts”
(p. vii). Lester had by no means rejected institutionalism, however, as 
can be seen by the titles of the book’s three major parts: “Labor’s 
Economic Problems” ; “Organization and Labor Relations” ; and 
“Collective Bargaining in Certain Industries.” Moreover, Lester es­
chewed the very generalization that theory seeks: “Generalization is 
especially difficult when each problem that arises maybe unique be­
cause it presents a slightly different combination of factors or a new 
set of circumstances” (p. 38).
Carroll Daugherty, who was strongly critical of the institutional 
approach in a 1945 paper on the labor field in the American Economic 
Review, was clearly underwhelmed by Lester’s text: “ There is, in fact, 
no labor textbook which satisfactorily employs and integrates the 
tools of economic analysis in its discussions. The best thing thus far in 
this respect is R. A. Lester’s Economics of Labor. . . and labor teachers 
and writers are greatly in his debt. But Lester, after berating his com­
petitors in front of his textbook audience . . .  misses the trapeze in 
midair and is fortunate to land in the safety net of confusion” (p. 655).
Despite his harsh words for Lester, Daugherty by no means rejected 
the need for understanding facts and institutions in the study of labor 
markets. Like the institutionalists, Daugherty maintained that “a good 
labor textbook and course” should still focus on “the several ‘prob­
lems’ of labor” and the efforts of workers, employers, unions, and the 
government to solve these problems. He added, however, that the ma­
terial in such a textbook or course “should be not just descriptive but
also and primarily analytical__ Every effort and every proposal to
‘solve’ a labor problem requires appraisal in economic terms and with 
the use of economic-analytical methods” (p. 653). In fact, deficiencies 
in their training in these methods explained why institutionalists were 
looked down upon by economists at large:
The fact that “price” economists have looked down their noses at teachers 
of labor courses is almost entirely the fault of the latter. The ranks of labor 
teachers have contained too many sociologists, political scientists, and 
historians, whose education, if any, in the use of the tools of economic 
analysis has been distressingly inadequate, and it is a feeble defense at best 
for such teachers to accuse the price economist of ivory-tower ism and de­
votion to impractical theory. The same thing is true of some labor text­
book writers. (Daugherty, 1945: 653)
Daugherty’s call for more analytic labor texts was a generation 
ahead of its time. Market forces are strong, and the market for analy­
ses of the labor market was still dominated by institutionalists. A text 
by Orme Phelps, a former student of Paul Douglas and an undergrad­
uate mentor of ILR’s Smith, illustrates the economic realities of ped­
dling labor economics texts to economists. In its first edition, 
published in 1950, Phelps’s Introduction to Labor Economics explained 
that labor economics is
concerned primarily with principles, secondarily with facts. That is not 
because facts are unimportant in labor economics. They are vitally impor­
tant . . .  [but] facts change with great rap id ity ... and those already col­
lected, while helpful for purposes of interpretation, often do not apply to 
the current problem. It is different with principles. The facts presented in
this book will therefore be intended as primarily illustrative, and empha­
sis will be concentrated on the methods of dealing with them in the solu­
tion of problems. (Phelps, 1950: 3- 4)
True to this theme, the first nine chapters of this text were devoted to 
issues of wages and unemployment; these were followed by the obliga­
tory chapters on unions, of which there were also nine.
By his second edition in 1955, however, Phelps bowed (we presume) 
to market pressures and reorganized his text to place ten chapters de­
scribing unions ahead of six chapters on wages and employment. The 
1955 text even added a wonderfully institutionalist chart describing 
labors “All-American Union Team” (Chart 4-5, p. 91), depicting 
George Meany as the fullback (and captain), John L. Lewis as the quar­
terback, the Teamsters’ Dave Beck as right halfback, Walter Reuther as 
left halfback, and Harry Bridges as left end. We confess to eagerly scan­
ning Phelps’s 1961 edition to see if the 1959 allegations of bribery 
against Jimmy Hoffa merited his listing as a “wide receiver,” only to 
find Phelps had dropped the chart. We were rewarded, however, with a 
detailed list of Hoffa’s alleged crimes and the colorful names of mob­
sters from whom it was said Hoffa had “received” ; among them, the 
student is informed, were “ Tony Ducks” Corallo, “Shorty” Feldman, 
and Paul “ The Waiter” Ricca (p. 93). Institutionalism in labor texts was 
clearly alive and well in the early ’60s.
Given the views of Daugherty and the dissonance between cogni­
tion and content displayed by Lester and Phelps, there was clearly in­
tellectual unrest in the field of labor economics in the postwar period. 
Although it was waged over a full generation, the battle between insti­
tutionalists and neoclassicists was formally joined in the mid-i940s 
through two widely followed debates: one on the marginal productiv­
ity theory of labor demand, and one on the usefulness of economic 
theory in explaining wage rates in the union sector.
Debate on the Marginal Productivity Theory of Demand
The reader may recall from a distant—and probably required—course 
that underlying the concept of labor demand by firms is the notion
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that adding workers while holding capital constant increases output. 
These increments to output (“marginal productivity” ) are assumed to 
diminish, however, as more and more labor is added, and a profit- 
maximizing firm will stop hiring when the value of labor’s marginal 
product falls below the cost of hiring this extra labor. Thus, theory im­
plies that when a wage increase causes the costs of hiring labor to rise, 
firms will cut their use of labor in order to bring the value of marginal 
productivity back in line with marginal labor costs. The concept of 
diminishing marginal productivity and the chain of reasoning under­
lying the postulated profit-seeking behavior are what underlie the 
downward-sloping labor demand curve.
Professor Lester took issue with the relevance of this theory of 
labor demand in an article published in 1946. His interviews with 
business executives (note the case study approach) led him to con­
clude that these decision makers neither thought in terms of marginal 
productivity nor, as a practical matter, could they explicitly calculate 
labor’s marginal product with any degree of confidence. He therefore 
concluded that “much of the economic reasoning on company em­
ployment adjustments to increases or decreases in wage rates is in­
valid, and a new theory of wage-employment relationships for the 
individual firm must be developed” (Lester, 1946: 71).
Professor Fritz Machlup, then at the University of Buffalo, sprang 
to the defense of neoclassical theory by arguing that Lester misun­
derstood the role of theoretical models in analyzing behavior. 
Machlup argued that a driver of a car deciding whether to overtake a 
truck proceeding slowly in front of him on a two-lane road will not 
explicitly measure or calculate in a formal way all the variables in­
volved in making a decision about overtaking the vehicle. However, 
if scientists were to model and predict this driver’s behavior, they 
would have to formally adopt and numerically solve such a model. 
Machlup argued that
the explanation of an action must often include steps of reasoning which 
the acting individual himself does not consciously perform (because the
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action has become routine) and which perhaps he would never be able to 
perform in scientific exactness (because such exactness is not necessary in 
everyday life). To call, on these grounds, the theory “invalid,” “unrealistic” 
or “inapplicable” is to reveal failure to understand the basic methodologi­
cal constitution of most social sciences. (Machlup, 1946: 535)
Machlup’s arguments carried the day, and even texts grounded in the 
institutionalist tradition, such as those by Reynolds and Phelps, con­
tinued to analyze the demand for labor in terms of the marginal pro­
ductivity model.7
Debate on the Relevance of the Economic Theory 
of Wage Determination
The second debate was joined by John Dunlop and Arthur Ross, two 
prominent economists who held differing views on how to analyze the 
wage policies pursued by unions. Dunlop called for a more analytical 
application of economic theory and argued that a theory of union be­
havior “requires that the organization be assumed to maximize (or min­
imize) something.” The subject of unionism “cannot be left any longer 
merely to institutional and historical methods” (Dunlop, 1944: 4).
Ross, rising to the defense of the institutionalist approach, an­
swered that union wage policy could not be understood by “the me­
chanical application of any maximization principle” and that unions 
were not primarily economic organizations. Ultimately, Ross argued 
that wages had less to do with economics than with social, political, 
and moral forces: “ There are forces in society and in the economy 
making for uniformity in the wage structure but they are not merely 
the forces of supply and demand__ Equity and justice have long per­
meated industrial society, but the growth of organization has en­
dowed them with compelling force” (Ross, 1948:74).
That Dunlop’s call for more use of systematic theory and less re­
liance on institutional idiosyncrasy eventually prevailed is best seen in 
the changes that took place in the longest-running institutionalist hit:
Lloyd Reynolds’s Labor Economics and Labor Relations. Between 1964 
and 1970, Professor Reynolds revised his popular text to place the sec­
tion called “Economics of the Labor Market” first rather than second. 
While his text was still clearly institutionalist, the preface to his fifth 
edition (1970) noted
In this edition, I have reversed the previous sequence and have placed the
economic analysis at the beginning of the book__ First, labor economics
is basic in the sense that the economics of collective bargaining is in­
cluded within it Second, research in labor economics is shifting in a
quantitative and econometric direction___The wealth of new research
material warrants both enlarging the “economic” component of this text 
and placing it at the beginning of the discussion. (Reynolds, 1970: iv)
More important than the ordering of topics, however, was the in­
creased emphasis on theory. In contrast to that one sorry graph in 
1949, fully twenty theory-related graphs could be found in the “eco­
nomics” part of the book’s 1970 edition—which by then actually had 
chapters on “demand” and “supply.”
Dunlop’s “victory” provides a good example of the curse of the an­
swered prayer, because thirty years later he was engaged in yet another 
institutionalist-neoclassicist debate—this one occurring in the pages 
of ILR’s professional journal, the Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review. In this debate, Dunlop was railing against models uninformed 
by facts and abstract analyses that were of no practical value to policy­
makers. In all fairness to Dunlop, he had originally called for a blend of 
theory and fact, but understanding why he felt compelled to speak out 
against the neoclassicists in 1977 as he had against the institutionalists 
in 1945 requires a review of developments in the intervening years.
The Tiger on a Rampage
It will come as no surprise that textbooks follow, rather than lead, in­
tellectual trends. The trend that by 1970 had induced a major change in 
the leading institutionalist text also gave birth to the first two theory- 
based labor economics textbooks in the postwar period: Labor
Economics: Theory and Evidence by Belton Fleisher (1970), and The 
Economics o f Work and Pay by Albert Rees (1973).8 These texts, which 
in many ways were quite similar, had surprisingly little in common 
with the textbooks of the 1940s and 1930s, or indeed even with the 1970 
edition of Reynolds’s textbook. In his preface, Fleisher wrote, “ The 
analytical backbone of the text is neoclassical economic theory.. . .
The major difference between this book and others is that I have main­
tained a strong position throughout that the economic theory dis­
cussed is useful in helping to advance our understanding of real world 
behavior” (Fleisher, 1970: iv-v).
Rees maintained in his introduction that economists trained in 
the “institutional tradition have tended to move into industrial rela­
tions . . .  and [become] somewhat isolated from the main stream of 
economics.” He wrote that his book “does not pretend to cover indus­
trial relations___Rather it will concentrate on the application of eco­
nomic theory and statistics to the problems of labor markets” (Rees, 
1973: viii).
A glance at the tables of contents shows how different the Fleisher 
and Rees texts were from their predecessors. The long sections on 
labor history, union organization, and social insurance were gone, as 
was the mention of labor “problems.” They were replaced by chapters 
on the supply of labor by individuals, human capital, and the demand 
for labor in competitive markets. Both books contained sections on 
trade unions, but these were now shorter than the sections on labor 
supply alone, and the analysis concerned only the “economic aspects” 
of unions, such as formal models of union objectives and measuring 
union/non-union wage differentials. Both books were so devoid of 
descriptive material that neither was as long as three hundred pages 
(Reynolds’s book was by now running nearly seven hundred pages). 
Their appearance suggests that the market for the neoclassical ap­
proach had grown to a critical size by the early 1970s, which in turn 
suggests that during the 1930s and 1960s some very important 
groundwork had been laid.
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The Pathbreakers
Economics, like many sciences, can be divided roughly into theoreti­
cal and applied fields. While theoretical fields in economics are ab­
stract and attract those inclined to see the beauty of mathematics, 
the applied fields attract scholars interested in practical problems 
and issues of public policy. Labor market scholars are usually of the 
latter variety, and for these scholars to become convinced that eco­
nomic theory was relevant to their concerns demanded intellectual 
leadership of two kinds.
Judging Economic Models. First, theoretical models had to be seen as 
legitimate by applied scholars, which required no small change of atti­
tude in the labor field. Institutionalists were inclined to think and write 
about the enormous complexities of the labor market, while the whole 
purpose of models is to strip away complexity and idiosyncrasy to 
reveal underlying tendency. Models are necessarily based on assump­
tions that serve to simplify behavioral issues so that prediction is 
possible. Thus it is commonly assumed, for purposes of making pre­
dictions about labor market behavior, that workers are well informed 
about the important aspects of their job offers and have a wide range 
of job choice available to them. If theories are to be judged on the real­
ism of their assumptions, as the institutionalists were wont to do, then 
one must question the usefulness of models based on such optimistic 
views of labor market conditions.
In the early 1950s, however, Milton Friedman (1953) —later a Nobel 
laureate in economics—argued for judging theories by the quality of 
their predictions, not the realism of their assumptions. If a theory pre­
dicts behavioral tendencies often enough to find support in the data, 
then it is useful even if its underlying assumptions do not always and 
everywhere hold. Friedman’s assertions, like those of Machlup earlier, 
helped to legitimize the theoretical approach of the neoclassicists.
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Areas of Inquiry. Science generally proceeds through a process in 
which the seminal efforts of highly creative scholars open up fields of 
inquiry and are then followed by numerous extensions and replications 
performed by what may best be described as the academic rank and 
file. In the 1950s and 1960s several areas of inquiry to which economic 
theory could be usefully applied were opened up for exploration.
One pathbreaker—widely recognized as the father of modern labor 
economics—was H. Gregg Lewis, an economist at the University of 
Chicago and a student of Paul Douglas.9 Lewis was a demanding, 
painstaking scholar who published only two books and scarcely a 
half-dozen articles, yet it is difficult to find a leading scholar in the 
field of analytical labor economics who was neither a colleague of his 
while formulating a seminal work nor among the ninety Ph.D. stu­
dents he supervised. In 1963 Lewis published a book that analyzed a 
traditional topic, unions, in a new way. Instead of focusing on the his­
tory, governance, and tactics of unions, as had the institutionalists, 
Lewis devoted the entire book to carefully measuring the effects of 
unions in raising members’ wages.10 His works have been called 
“models of how economic theory, statistical and econometric meth­
ods and painstaking handling of data can be joined to produce mas­
terly professional contributions” (American Economic Review, 
September 1982, caption to frontispiece). Following Lewis’s economic 
analysis of unions, Orley Ashenfelter and George Johnson (1969) pub­
lished an article that analyzed collective bargaining as a tripartite 
process involving workers, union leaders, and employers—thus satis­
fying both Dunlop’s call for theory and Ross’s emphasis on such 
“noneconomic” forces as union politics.
A  second major pathbreaker was Gary Becker, winner of the 1992 
Nobel Prize in economics. Becker made three major contributions to 
the development of labor economics during this period. In 1957 he 
published The Economics of Discrimination, in which he posited that a
person with a “taste for discrimination” will act “as if he were willing 
to pay something, either directly or in the form of a reduced income, 
to be associated with some persons instead of others” (Becker, 1957: 
14). Based on this concept, Becker provided a framework with which 
to analyze and measure a problem (yes, an evil) that was—and is—too 
important to be poorly understood.
Becker also was one of the pioneers, along with Theodore Schultz 
(1963) and Jacob Mincer (1962b), in the development of the theory of 
human capital. In Human Capital (1964), he argued that education 
and on-the-job training should be viewed as forms of investment and 
that individuals’ decisions concerning the amount to invest are based 
on a comparison of costs with the expected returns to these invest­
ments later on. This theory opened up serious study of behaviors that 
critically affect the acquisition of skills and hence the level of individ­
ual wages, the distribution of earnings, and the demand for formal 
and informal schooling (which together create the skills that consti­
tute almost half of our stock of national wealth).
Becker’s third major contribution has become known as the the­
ory of household production. In his 1965 paper “A Theory of the 
Allocation of Time,” Becker viewed household activities as the com­
bination of time and goods to produce commodities that yield hap­
piness: meals, leisure activities, clean living spaces, and the like.1 1 
The cost o f time at home is measured by forgone earnings; thus 
labor supply and household decisions are intertwined. Becker’s work 
on household production, along with Mincer’s 1962 paper “ Labor 
Force Participation of Married Women,” represented attempts “ to 
place the theory of labour supply in the context of family decision­
making, combining non-market household behaviour with market 
behaviour” (Blaug, 1985:165). Mincer (1962a) found that married 
women’s participation rates were negatively related to their family’s 
income (the “ income effect” ) and positively related to their own 
wage rates, holding income constant (the “substitution effect” ). His 
careful measurement and empirical estimation of income and sub­
stitution effects marked the beginning of “modern research on labor 
supply” (Pencavel, 1986: 5). The work on labor supply by Becker and
Mincer permitted and encouraged widespread analysis of the rising 
labor force participation of women and the labor supply effects of 
social welfare programs.
The final pathbreaker to be discussed here is George Stigler, the 
1982 winner of the Nobel Prize in economics. In two papers published 
in the early 1960s, Stigler developed the economic theory of informa­
tion and its labor subfield, the theory of job search. He argued that in­
formation is a valuable resource that is costly to obtain. An 
unemployed person looking for work, “unless his degree of specializa­
tion is pathological,” faces “an immense number of potential employ­
ers” and needs to determine “how to acquire information on the wage 
rates, stability of employment,. . .  [and working conditions] which 
would be obtained from every one of these potential employers” 
(Stigler, 1962: 94). Information is obtained by engaging in the costly 
activity of “job search,” and Stigler argued that a maximizing worker 
will continue to search “until the expected return equals the marginal 
cost of search” (1962:96). Because search is both necessary and often 
cheaper when one is unemployed, and because the presence of unem­
ployment insurance effectively subsidizes continued search, Stigler’s 
contribution opened up insights useful to the analysis of unemploy­
ment and its remedies.
Research in the 1970s and 1980s
By the early 1970s, neoclassical labor economics was an active field 
whose members wrote increasingly more like neoclassical theorists 
and less like the institutionalists. For example, at the beginning of a 
work on labor supply might be the following prelude: “We assume a 
person maximizes his utility subject to the constraints given by the 
production functions and full wealth. If the utility and production 
functions are twice differentiable, necessary conditions for an interior 
maximum include ...” (Ghez and Becker, 1975:5). The statement 
would then be followed by a series of mathematical equations which a 
graduate student or journal referee might spend the better part of an 
hour trying to understand, but over which a more casual reader 
would skip in search of the next block of English text.
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In addition to articles full of equations and Greek letters, labor eco­
nomics papers became highly statistical. Because computers made it 
possible for the most ordinary, uninventive scholar to analyze large 
data sets, there was a virtual flood of empirical papers on labor supply 
behavior, rates of return to schooling and other forms of training, and 
wage differentials (by race, gender, and union status). Whereas insti­
tutionalists had relied on case studies, with personal interviews of 
from five to perhaps fifty sample participants, the new labor econo­
mists relied on data collected by the government (mostly for purposes 
other than the research at hand) and reported results from statistical 
samples that often contained thousands of observations.
Institutionalists criticized the new research on grounds that the re­
searchers were naive (they tried to reduce behavior to statistical equa­
tions) and lazy (in that they did not “know” their data and thus had 
little idea of their quality). Even the dean of Cornell’s ILR School in 
1983, Charles Rehmus, publicly scolded modern labor economists in a 
speech at the University of Hawaii:
Institutional “Wisconsin-School” training in labor economics—strong on 
history, doubtful of market restraints, fairly supportive of unions, and fa­
voring ameliorative social legislation—is no longer the mode. Instead, 
neoclassical econometrics has come to dominate the field of labor eco­
nomics. Excruciatingly detailed analysis of available statistics gives the 
impression that modern economists believe that numbers constitute the 
real world, that correlations prove econometric causality and that regres­
sion results verify the broadest theories.
Dean Rehmus’s remarks did—for a time at least—divert the intel­
lectual energy of ILR’s labor economists from number-crunching to 
the writing of angry memos. The department’s annual report that 
year, usually a dry, perfunctory recitation of professional accomplish­
ments, began with a three-page, single-spaced explanation to the dean 
(surely no one else reads these reports!) about the theoretical and em­
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pirical methods employed by labor economists. The feelings that un­
derlay the institutionalist-neoclassicist debate can be guessed from 
the report’s second paragraph:
Unfortunately, however, some of the criticism that we sustained this year 
seems to many of us to go beyond academic dialogue, addressing instead 
our motivation for employing our craft. We are all-too-often seen as 
rather insensitive to the interests of working people, uniform in our politi­
cal ideology, and trying to fit the square peg of reality into the round hole 
of quantification. It is these questions about our intellectual integrity that 
disturb us the most, and it is to these questions that the introduction to 
this report is addressed.
Institutionalist criticisms did nothing to stop the flood of analyti­
cal papers in the field; in fact, during the very year of Rehmus’s speech 
a new journal (the Journal of Labor Economics) was founded—in part 
because the supply of analytical papers in the field far exceeded the 
space for them in existing journals. The ease and enthusiasm with 
which theory was now being applied by labor economists to social is­
sues, and even to such “nonmarket” activities as household produc­
tion, also led to applications well beyond the bounds most people set 
for economics: articles or books with economic models of church at­
tendance, marriage, and even extramarital affairs cropped up.12 
These wide-ranging extensions led to further criticisms that in their 
secular vein decried “economic imperialism” and in their more eccle­
siastical versions asked, “ Is nothing sacred from the rational modeling 
of economists?”
In 1977, John Dunlop again spoke out with a public critique of 
methodology. In contrast to his comments in the 1940s on the need 
for more theory, Dunlop now argued (in the Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review) that neoclassical analyses had gone so far in their 
abstraction as to be useless for policy purposes: “ Tests of the elegance, 
coherence, and generality of economic and industrial relations mod­
els and theories are intellectually exciting and challenging, but their 
relevance and application to policy making is scarcely within the 
reach of most researchers” (Dunlop, 1977).
ILR’s Ronald Ehrenberg (Ehrenberg et al., 1977) strongly de­
murred, arguing with others that the Carter administration’s policy 
decision to tax unemployment insurance benefits was but a recent 
example of the influence on public policy of neoclassical analysis 
(which had demonstrated, after Stigler, that higher benefits encour­
age longer spells of joblessness). Indeed, throughout the 1980s mem­
bers of Ehrenberg’s department were hired to work for, or with, three 
different agencies within the U.S. Department of Labor, three within 
the Department of Health and Human Services, four international 
development agencies, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com­
mission, the Small Business Administration, Congress, several state 
agencies, and even the CIA! In fact, neoclassical labor economists 
became so involved with policy analysis that, as we argue below, they 
became more institutionalist!
The Tiger Is Tamed (and Acquires Some Spots)
The greater involvement of analytical labor economists with public 
policy issues forced three major changes in their research. First, be­
cause one cannot understand public policy issues without a thorough 
grounding in institutional detail, labor economists necessarily became 
more “institutional” in their interests. Seemingly small administrative 
details about how unemployment or workers’ compensation insurance 
premiums are set have huge implications for the layoff or safety behav­
ior of employers; labor economists wanting the ear of policymakers— 
or, for that matter, a publication in a leading journal—had better know 
these details. Moreover, institutions have histories that both reflect and 
affect behavior; the ahistorical approach of neoclassical theory might 
yield behavioral tendencies, but in some cases a larger context is re­
quired if sensible policies are to be promulgated.
Second, along with greater prominence in public policy came 
greater responsibility for the accuracy and credibility of empirical re­
suits. Few in society care in the abstract about whether coal is pro­
duced under conditions of constant elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labor, but if the structure of a black lung benefits tax is at 
issue, the conditions under which coal is produced matter very much 
because real jobs are on the line. The quality of one’s data and statisti­
cal methods began to really matter when the answers started to affect 
lives instead of “dry bones” abstractions.
Third, greater policy prominence required labor economists to write 
for new audiences—people who are intelligent but not necessarily 
schooled in the use of economic jargon or patient with complex equa­
tions resembling the Athens phone book. This forced many in the disci­
pline of labor economics to use ordinary English instead of jargon. 
Congressman Lee Hamilton once wrote, “For me, the most important 
quality for economists to have when they are testifying or advising pol­
icy-makers is the ability to express their ideas on important policy is­
sues clearly and simply, without jargon” (Hamilton, 1992: 61).
Jargon is not only confusing to outsiders, but in economics it can 
border on “offensive speech.” As an example of the latter, economists 
had frequently used a piece of jargon, “the value of life,” when trying to 
value the benefits of risk reductions mandated by federal safety pro­
grams. In fact, this offensive term is really shorthand for “the aggregate 
of what individuals are willing to spend for small reductions in risk.”
An economist wanting to be heard on the issue of safety programs 
must either avoid the offensive shorthand or be prepared to rebut 
charges that he or she is willing to contemplate industrial genocide.
Recent years, therefore, have seen a movement away from some of 
the more objectionable features of “pure” neoclassical analyses and to­
ward some of the less objectionable characteristics of the institution­
alist approach. More researchers are collecting their own data, and 
more are now relying on case studies involving some exogenous eco­
nomic or policy change to create the comparisons needed for hypoth­
esis testing. Even controlled experiments have been run, both in the 
laboratory and out.
But more than sampling methodology has changed. Economists 
have begun to widen their “homo economicus” view of economic
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Is S tu dy ing  Neoclassical Econom ics Socia lly  Harm ful?
Professor Robert Frank, a Cornell economist who splits his time between 
the Arts College and the Johnson School of Management, recently re­
searched the question of whether those trained in economics are less 
likely to act in communitarian ways and more likely to act selfishly. Frank 
points out that economic theory defines "public goods" as those, such as 
over-the-air television shows or national defense, whose consumption 
cannot be denied to nonpayers.The theory implies that those who wish 
to maximize their utility will accept a "free ride" by enjoying the good but 
taking advantage of those who pay by withholding their own financial 
contribution. Frank and two psychology professors at Cornell hypothe­
sized that those familiar with the free rider problem— i.e., those trained 
in economics— will be more likely themselves to be free riders.
While apparently no less likely to vote or engage in volunteer activities, 
economics professors do apparently give less to charity than do others, 
and economics majors are less likely to act cooperatively in experimental 
bargaining games. While clearly reluctant to shoot the messenger who 
says that free rides are possible, Frank and his colleagues point out that 
maximizing one's utility over time may require a more complex set of 
considerations than the narrow model with which most neoclassicists 
typically work.They argue that other market participants can identify po­
tential free riders, and if given the opportunity to choose with whom to 
interact, they will potentially shun free riders. Thus, free riding may be 
personally as well as socially dysfunctional, and "with an eye toward both 
the social good and the well-being of their own students, economists 
may wish to stress a broader view of human motivation in their teaching" 
(Frank etal., 1993:171).
agents as narrowly self-serving and autonomous, to include consider­
ations of social interdependency and context. Papers or books by 
labor economists have recently appeared with such titles as “ The Fair 
Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment” (Akerlof and Yellen, 
1990), The Labor Market as a Social Institution (Solow, 1990), “ Fairness
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as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market” 
(Kahneman et alM 1986), and Choosing the Right Pond: Human 
Behavior and the Quest for Status (Frank, 1985). Cornell economist 
Robert Frank, in fact, has explicitly called for economists to reflect in 
their teaching and research a view of human motivation broader than 
the narrow self-interest usually stressed (see box, above).
One of the most important ways in which analytical labor economics 
is becoming more like earlier institutionalism lies in the attention given 
to wage setting practices by individual employers. Institutionalists, it 
will be recalled, described such practices in detail but offered no general 
principles underlying them. Neoclassical economics provided a useful 
alternative by emphasizing market forces, which allowed for the delin­
eation of general principles, but it initially ignored what appear to be 
practices that are inconsistent with such principles. Issues of why some 
employers pay wages that are above the market wage, why older workers 
are sometimes paid more than they are worth, and how perceptions of 
relative status and fairness of treatment affect behavior have only re­
cently concerned neoclassical labor economists. Unlike the older insti­
tutionalists, however, analytical economists studying these issues seek to 
establish the general principles underlying practices and social conven­
tions that at first glance appear to conflict with the behavior anticipated 
by simple economic models.
Even the study of unions has changed. During the 1960s and 1970s 
most neoclassical economists who studied unions followed the trail 
blazed by Gregg Lewis, focusing on estimating unions’ monopoly 
wage effects. In 1984, however, two neoclassical labor economists, 
Richard Freeman and James Medoff, published a book entitled What 
Do' Unions Do?, which offered “a new portrait of U.S. unionism.” 
Freeman and Medoff argued that neoclassical economists had pro­
duced “very little quantitative evidence concerning the impact of U.S.
unionism on outcomes other than wages,” and that analytical labor 
economists generally ignored the institutionalists’ view that unions 
often raise productivity and induce better management. They used 
newly available “computerized data files, which contain vast amounts 
of information on thousands of individuals, establishments, and com­
panies,” to statistically analyze “many of the nonwage effects of trade 
unions” (pp. 4-5). Their results indicated that many of the institution­
alists’ hypotheses concerning unions were correct. In particular, they 
found that unions raised productivity in many sectors of the econ­
omy, largely as a result of lower rates of turnover under unionism and 
of “improved managerial performance in response to the union chal­
lenge” (pp. 21-22). Freeman and Medoff concluded that the positive 
aspects of unionism stressed by institutionalists usually outweighed 
the negative (monopoly) aspects stressed by most neoclassical econo­
mists, and therefore that “unionism generally serves as a force for so­
cial and economic good” (p. 247).
Can this new “creeping institutionalism” be explained solely as the 
response of autonomous maximizers to the economic incentives of­
fered by government consultancies or the psychic utility of influenc­
ing public policy? Being thoroughly modern ourselves, we think 
not—and we offer two social/psychological explanations as supple­
ments. First, only the most emotionally secure (or deranged) econo­
mists were unaffected by the charge of trying to put round empirical 
pegs in square theoretical holes. We hypothesize that most found the 
“you just don’t understand” responses no more useful in their pro­
fessional than in their private lives; sooner or later they had to incor­
porate at least the appearance of institutional concerns in their 
papers to avoid indigestion whenever lunching with colleagues out­
side the field of economics.
Second, we suspect that modern labor economists are similar to 
their institutional colleagues in their fundamental desire to under­
stand how employers and employees really behave. “Dry bones” the­
ory provided skeletal support for the modern analyses, but empirical 
flesh and blood still provided the motivation. Early empirical work 
using large data sets and advanced computing techniques provided
general support for some theoretical implications, but offered disap­
pointing results regarding others; further scientific advances required 
taking more sophisticated account of social and institutional idiosyn­
crasies. If the new interests of modern labor economics are in fact dri­
ven by the imperatives of science, then the institutionalist and 
neoclassical approaches may well synthesize—and the debates be­
tween the two that characterized the past half century may well seem 
incomprehensible in much of the next. ■
Notes
1 What was “new” about neoclassical economics will be described later.
2 It must be said that Coase is not very fond of what replaced institutionalism, 
either. Concerning “high theory,” Coase writes: “In my youth it was said that 
what was too silly to be said may be sung. In modern economics it may be put 
into mathematics.” Concerning regression analysis, the primary statistical tool 
of modern labor economics, Coase writes: “If you torture the data enough, na­
ture will always confess.” (Both quotes are cited in Posner, 1993:198-99.)
3 Hicks’s book was important for several reasons. For one thing, it contained 
one of the earliest discussions of individuals’ supply of labor. Second, it con­
tained Hicks’s model of the bargaining process between labor and manage­
ment, which is still taught in both labor economics and collective bargaining 
courses.
4 Ely, by the way, is honored each year by a “Richard T. Ely Lecture” to members 
of the American Economic Association, the major professional body of econo­
mists. As recently as 1993, the distinguished economist selected as lecturer 
was insisting that economists use their insights to help improve social welfare.
5 One of the leaders in the application of mathematics to economic theory was 
John Hicks, whose 1938 Value and Capital quickly became a classic.
6 A book edited by Clark Kerr and Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Economics and 
Industrial Relations (1994), offers current perspectives by many of these au­
thors, whom some now call “neoinstitutionalists.” One chapter, by Bruce 
Kaufman (“The Evolution of Thought on the Competitive Nature of Labor 
Markets”), presents an interesting “history of thought” organized around the 
question whose answer more or less divided the institutionalists from the 
neoclassicists: How competitive is the labor market?
7 Lester’s text, of course, professed the irrelevance of marginal analysis, al­
though he did not replace traditional labor demand theory with any other.
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Some of his views on worker productivity, however, were atheoretical precur­
sors to the modern development of “efficiency wage” theory, which asserts that 
under certain conditions, higher wages increase workers’ effort (and therefore 
their productivity).
8 A third book, Richard Freeman’s Labor Economics (1972), could also be in­
cluded in this list. Freeman’s book is theory-based, but it is quite short and 
was not intended to be a text for a full semester course in labor economics. *
9 A series of comments honoring Lewis can be found in Ashenfelter, 1994.
10 In what can only be marvelled at as an act of extreme perseverance, Lewis 
continued to study the issue and published a second book on the union wage 
effect more than two decades later: see Lewis, 1986.
11 More recently, Becker has generalized his theory of the allocation of time to 
include various aspects of family behavior. In A Treatise on the Family (1981), 
he analyzes “marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, pres­
tige, and other nonmaterial behavior with the tools and framework developed 
for material behavior” (p. ix). It is no wonder that an article has been written 
about him entitled “Gary S. Becker: The Economist as Empire-Builder” 
(Shackleton, 1981).
12 See Ehrenberg, 1977; Becker, 1981; and Fair, 1978.
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